|
1960
Chronology of Cambodian History Abbreviations
on this page
Cambodia places
with UN her accession to the Convention On The Recognition And Enforcement
Of Foreign Arbitral Awards. Feb. 20,
1960 May 8,
1960 PM Pho Proeung and
visiting Chinese Premier Chou En-lai issue a joint declaration following
their meeting. May 19,
1960 Cambodia and World
Health Organization sign in Phnom Penh a basic agreement
for the provision of technical advisory assistance. Secretary of State for Health Yim
Dith signed for Cambodia and Regional Director I. C. Fang for the WHO.
July 15,
1960 Cambodia and United
States exchange notes
constituting an agreement relating to the exchange of official
publication. Nov. 24,
1960 Cambodia and UN
Special Fund sign, in Phnom Penh, an agreement
concerning assistance from the Special Fund. Phlek Chhat, Director General of
Planning of the Ministry of Planning, signed for Cambodia and Walter De
Selys Longchamps, Regional Representative of the Special Fund, for UN.
Nov. 27,
1960 Cambodia and
Czechoslovakia sign in Prague Treaty
of Friendship and Co-operation, Prince Sihanouk signs for Cambodia;
and Agreement
On Cultural Co-operation, Pho Proeung signs for
Cambodia. Nov. 30,
1960 Cambodia and UN
exchange letters
constituting an agreement for the provision of operation and executive
personnel. Dec. 12,
1960 Cambodia, Laos,
Thailand, Republic of Vietnam and Australia signed in Bangkok an agreement
concerning tax exemption of contribution of Australia for the development
of water resources of the Lower Mekong Basin. Dec. 15,
1960 Cambodia and Thailand
exchanged letters constituting an Agreement relating to the press and
radio [5490], Agreement relating
to the joint repression of criminal offences in the frontier region
[5491], Agreement relating
to rebels and political refugees [5492] and Agreement
relating to common law criminals [5493].
Abbreviations
on this page
Cambodia places
with UN her acceptance of the Convention On The Intergovernmental Maritime
Consultative Organization. Jan. 28,
1961 Penn Nouth becomes
Prime Minister (01/28/1961-11/17/61). May 26,
1961
Nov. 17,
1961 Prince Norodom
Sihanouk becomes Prime Minister
(11/17/1961-02/13/1962).
Abbreviations
on this page
Feb. 13,
1962 Nhiek Tioulong becomes
acting Prime Minister (02/13/1962-08/06/1962) April 4,
1962 Cambodia places
with UN her ratification of the Convention And Protocol For The Protection
Of Cultural Property In The Event Of Armed Conflict. Chau Sen becomes Prime
Minister (08/06/62-10/06/62). Oct. 6,
1962 Prince Norodom Kantol
becomes Prime Minister (10/06/62-10/25/66). Nov. 19,
1962
Abbreviations
on this page
Feb. 11,
1963 Cambodia places
with UN her accession to Customs Convention Concerning Facilities for the
Importation of Goods for Display or Use at Exhibitions, Fairs, Meetings or
Similar Events. Feb. 20,
1963 Cambodia places
with UN her accession to Customs Convention on the Temporary Importation
of Packing. The PRC Pres. Liu
Shao-Chi visits Cambodia. May 5,
1963
Oct. 18,
1963 Cambodia, Laos,
Thailand and Republic of Vietnam sign an agreement
with Netherlands concerning the Netherlands’ contribution to the Committee
for the Co-ordination of Investigations of the Lower Mekong
Basin. Nov. 6,
1963 Cambodia places
with UN her accession to the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities
of the United Nations. The National Congress
of the Sangkum Reash Niyum votes unanimously not to accept US
aid. Nov. 21,
1963
Abbreviations
on this page
Jan. 15,
1964 Cambodia and France
sign an agreement
relating to air transportation in Paris. PM Pho Proeung signed for
Cambodia and Augustin Jordan for France. Jan. 24,
1964 Bristish Amb. call on Secretary of State Rusk to
discuss the differences between his country and the U.S. on handling the
Soviet proposal for a conference on Cambodia neutrality. [Memo of
Conversation] Amb. Sprouse suggests
the State Dept. to “give serious consideration our going on record with
Sihanouk through UK as one of co-Chairmen by expressing willingness to
accept drafts as they stand, thus obviating need for conference if other
concerned countries agree.” [21] Feb. 8, 1964 US State Dept. response to Sprouse’s suggestion concerning the propose conference on Cambodian neutrality.
Feb. 19,
1964
US Emb. in
Phnom Penh inform
Washington of Sihanouk’s new proposal. Prince Sihanouk proposes a
quadripartite (US, SVN, Thailand, and Cambodia) negotiations which lead to
an agreement recognizing Cambodia’s neutrality and borders without a
conference; and Cambodia would observe strict neutrality and prevent the
passage or presence of rebel across or on its territory.
US inform Cambodia of its acceptance in principle to
attend a Quadripartite Conference on Cambodian neutrality. [21] March 3,
1964 US National Security Council Staff Michael V. Forrestal sends memo to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy), “…..We told the Cambodians privately yesterday that in principle we agreed to attend a Quadripartite (Thailand-Vietnam-U.S.-Cambodia) Conference on Cambodian neutrality. The GVN has already agreed to do so publicly, and the Thais have said that, although they haven't been asked officially, they would give sympathetic consideration to the idea. Today telegrams are coming in from Phnom Penh reporting Sprouse's meeting with the Cambodian Foreign Minister, at which time the latter turned over to Sprouse a pile of Cambodian draft proposals for a neutrality declaration and protocol. Unfortunately, our drafts have only been given to the GVN and the Thais; so we have been caught flat-footed on two counts. We have made no public announcement of our agreement to the Quadripartite Conference, and Sihanouk has beaten us to the punch on the draft proposals. Hilsman thinks we should defer any further public statements until we have had a chance to examine the Cambodian package…” On the same day, State Dept. instructs its embassy in Phnom Penh to submit copies of draft documents to the Government of Cambodia. March 4, 1964 US Embassy in Phnom Penh informs State Dept. of its delivery of draft document and wait for Prince Sihanouk’s reaction. March 5, 1964 Prince Sihanouk, in a speech, charges that the US
blamed Cambodia and North Vietnam for its defeat in South Vietnam, but
because of Chinese Communist strength, dared not strike Hanoi, so instead
devised a plan to invade Cambodia with Khmer Serei and South Vietnamese
forces. [21] March 9, 1964 US Ambassador to Laos Unger telegram Dept. of State concerning his meeting with Laos PM Souvanna, who had met with Prince Sihanouk. March 10, 1964 Secretary Rusk instructs US Embassy in Bangkok to approach Thai leader in order to exploit the opportunity following Prince Sihanouk’s negative reaction to US proposal. Earlier, Sihanouk disagreed with US draft proposals for a 4-power conference and saw them as a rejection of his own proposals for the quadripartite conference on Cambodia neutrality. March 11,
1964 US Amb. Spivack informs
State Dept. of heavy demonstration and rock throwing against US Embassy in
Phnom Penh. Secretary Rusk informs Cambodian Secretary of State for
Foreign Affair, Huot Sambath, of his shock and concern over the attacks
and reminds the Minister that US draft proposals for the 4-power
conference are not intended as a substitute for those of Cambodia, and
asks for assurance that American lives and property could be protected in
Cambodia. Amb. Spivack telegrams
to the State Dept. stating that the March 11 attacks on US and Brit.
embassies was approved by Cambodian Government in advance. US National Security Council Staff sends memo to Bundy,
“Sihanouk has
accused the US of sabotaging his proposed 4-nation conference. He has also
said that we have been trying to kill a reconvening of the Geneva
Conference. Sihanouk has sent
a mission to Hanoi to discuss South Vietnamese frontiers and supposedly is
going to agree to establish diplomatic relation with North VN. The destructive rioting of March
11 from all indications was clearly sanctioned by the Cambodian Government
and probably was carried out in order to impress Peking and Hanoi. At present there seems to be some
confusion at the Dept. as to what they should do next. Rusk is alleged to have said in an
informal conversation last night that perhaps we should have a conference
on Cambodian neutrality with either the 1954 or the 1962
participants. Harriman, on
the other hand, is reported to be inclined to call in the Cambodians and
express displeasure as only he can do it.” [21] March 16,
1964 State Dept. telegram to US Embassy in Phnom Penh concerning Secretary Rusk’s conversation with departing Cambodian Amb. to the US Nong Kimny.
State Dept. informs
the US Embassy in UK about the scheduled phone conversation between
Secretary Rusk and his Brit. counterpart over Cambodia issues. Amb. Spivack advises the State Dept. to study Prince Sihanouk’s position. [Telegram] April 2, 1964 US Pres. Johnson meets with his National Security
Council to discuss US policy towards a number of countries, including
Cambodia: “Sihanouk has made a turn-around, and, therefore, the critical
situation in Cambodia is improved.
Developments will slow down because Sihanouk is taking a vacation
and visiting France. Amb.
Bohlen is seeing de Gaulle today in an effort to persuade the General to
issue a statement clarifying French policy in SEA. The hope is that de Gaulle would
issue a statement that his support of neutralization applies in the future
and the immediate present.” [21] April 6, 1964 Bundy sends memo to Secretary Rusk concerning the possibility of inviting Prince Sihanouk to visit the US. April 12, 1964 US and France officials meet in the US Embassy in Manila to discuss Cambodia issue. [Memo of Conversation] April 13, 1964 SEATO holds its Ninth Council Meeting in Manila from
04/13-15, 1964. [21] April 16, 1964 Thomas Hughes, Director of Intelligence and Research, sends memo to Marshall Green, Dep. Assistant Secretary of State concerning the use of Cambodian territory by Viet Cong. May 15, 1964 Harlan Cleveland, Assistant Secretary of State, informs Secretary Rusk about the UN Security Council action on Cambodian complaint. May 21, 1964 US State Dept. telegram Embassy in Cambodia concerning the possibilities of UN peacekeeping along Cambodian-Vietnamese border. May 25, 1964 US State Dept. instructs its Mission to the UN of action to be taken at the world body regarding to Cambodia. May 30, 1964 Cleveland sends memo to George W Ball, Acting Secretary of State regarding the UN Security Council resolution on Cambodian complaint. June 1, 1964 Prince Sihanouk departs Cambodia for a 6-week stay in
France. [21] June 3, 1964 US Embassy in Phnom Penh telegram the State Dept. of Sihanouk’s departure which provides occasion for broad survey of Cambodia’s present situation and relations with the US. June 4, 1964 Joseph Sisco, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, sends memo to Rusk regarding Cambodia complaint in the UN Security Council. June 12, 1964 US State Dept. instructs its Mission to the UN of action to be taken with the world body concerning Cambodia. June 16,
1964 June 30, 1964 Bundy sends note to William Trueheart, Director of the Office of SEA Affairs, regarding a proposed message to convey to Prince Sihanouk. Secretary of State Rusk sends letter to John McCone, CIA Director, regarding their conversation about Prince Sihanouk. July 2, 1964 US State Dept. suggests Amb. Bohlen to use the transmission of a greeting from Pres. Johnson thanking Prince Sihanouk for a similar message to discuss prospects for US-Cambodian relations. [21] July 4, 1964 US Amb. To France Bohlen telegrams
the State Dept. regarding his meeting with Prince Sihanouk a day
earlier. Randolp Kidder is appointed
Ambassador to Cambodia.
Prince Sihanouk refuses to accept his credentials. [21] July 29,
1964 US Assistant
Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy) sends memo to Secretary
of State Rusk, "..state that it would be worthwhile to follow
up on the channel to Sihanouk which has developed and therefore suggested
that he call upon you, Governor Harriman or me and that he be authorized
to report on such a meeting in a letter to Sihanouk. Mr. McCone suggested
further that in his letter to Sihanouk could convey his "impressions" as
being views derived from this meeting and other contacts since his return
to Washington. Although we agree that might provide a useful second
channel of communication, we should avoid developing what might turn into
an alternative channel of communication outside the normal diplomatic
framework. If Ambassador Kidder's mission is to be a success, the Prince
should be convicted that his contacts with Ambassador Kidder provide the
best means of contact with the US Government. Although we see considerable
merit in providing Sihanouk with an occasional channel of communication
through we do not favor the development of an alternative channel to
Ambassador Kidder. Recommendation:
1. That I see and that his contacts in the Department be confined
within the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs.
2. If you approve, that you sign the attached letter to Mr.
McCone.” [21] July 30, 1964 Director Trueheart memo to
Assistant Secretary Bundy about Pres. Jonhson's sending of Amb. Kidder to
Cambodia in the hope of establishing a channel of communication with
Sihanouk. US State Dept telegram
to its Embassy in Vietnam regarding UNSC Mission Report on Cambodian-South
VN border. Aug. 12, 1964 Bundy, Charlotte Peters and unnamed participants discuss
about ? correspondence with Prince Sihanouk. Aug. 24, 1964 Dep. Assistant Sisco sends memo to
Secretary of State Rusk concerning the possibility of UNSC meeting on
Cambodia-Vietnam. Aug. 30, 1964 Prince Sihanouk and the National Assembly jointly and
formally reject the finding of the report of the UNSC Mission.
[21] Sept. 18, 1964 Amb. Kidder leaves Phnom Penh. He is appointed Ambassador to
Cambodia on July 9, but Prince Sihanouk refuses to accept his credentials.
[21] Sept. 28, 1964 Prince Sihanouk meets with PRC leader Mao Zedong in
Beijing. [Conversation] Oct. 20, 1964 Oct. 22, 1964 A South VN unit with two US advisers clash with
Vietcong across the Cambodian border near the village of Banteay Chakrey.
Three South VN soldiers and a US adviser are killed.[21]
Cambodia files a protest with the UN accusing the US of having
participated in the attack. Oct. 24, 1964 US say Cambodia shot down one of three US C-123
aircraft that strayed into Cambodian territory, killing eight US crewmen.
[21] Prince Sihanouk, Chief of State, protests the attacks
in a note to Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko and British Foreign
Secretary Patrick Gordon Walker. Nov. 15,
1964 US
Department of State sends telegram
to the Embassy in Cambodia and France concerning US-Cambodian
relation.
Dec. 3,
1964 US State Dept. circulates telegram regarding to the forthcoming talks at New Delhi between Cambodian and US representatives. Dec. 17,
1964 US State
Dept. sends telegram
to its Embassy in Cambodia concerning the outcome of Delhi talks between
Cambodian and US. Dec. 28,
1964 Jame
Thomson, National Security Council Staff, sends memo to
Pres. Johnson concerning Cambodia-US relation. 1965
Chronology of Cambodian History Abbreviations
on this page
Bundy informs Pres. Johnson about Prince Sihanouk’s letter to the editor, in which the Prince claimed that Cambodia’s stability and neutrality was in spite of US, Thai, and South VN attempts to subvert it. Jan. 14, 1965 US Amb.
Bowles and Cambodian Amb. to India, Nong Kimny, meet to discuss
US-Cambodia relations. [21] Jan. 27, 1965 US State Dept. telegram to US Embassy in India about report of Amb. Bowles conversation with Nong Kimny. March 1-9, 1965 April 15, 1965 US and UK officials meet to discuss Cambodia at the White House. [Memo of Conversation] April 18, 1965 Secretary
Rusk asks Amb. Taylor by telegram to raise with South VN FM Pham Hut Quat
the question of a Cambodian conference as a possible means of initiating a
settlement between North and South VN. [21] April 21,
1965 Bundy sends
memo
to Secretary Rusk concerning the handling of Cambodian Conference
Proposal. April 30, 1965 US Pres.
Johnson talks on the phone with Bundy concerning the bombing of a
Cambodian village. [Transcript] May 1, 1965 US airplanes bomb villages in the area known as
"Parrot Beak" along Cambodia-South Vietnam border. US
President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) sends
memo to President Johnson concerning Prince Sihanouk's announcement, “You may have seen in
the morning news that the Cambodians have broken diplomatic relations with
us. Our people are not surprised. The initial recommendation for a prompt
apology on the accidental air attack was based on a hope that it might
marginally affect this Cambodian decision, but my own judgment is that
relations were about to break anyway. Moreover, it is good that the
Cambodians have put the burden equally on Newsweek and on the air attacks.
This Cambodian decision makes a proposed apology irrelevant. We will deal
with the air matter by saying that it is still under investigation. We
will further say that this break of relations does not affect our position
on a Cambodian conference (we have no relations at all with North Vietnam
and China, who would also be in such a conference). Finally, we will say
that we are still reviewing the question whether we wish to keep a
consulate in Phnom Penh, which the Cambodians have apparently suggested.
More generally, if we get any flak on this air accident, now or later, we
will point out in reply that Cambodia has provided a variety of facilities
for the Viet Cong over a long period of time and is therefore in a poor
position to criticize a single Air Force error, however tragic it is for
those who were hit.” [21] Pol Pot, secretary general of the Workers Party of
Kampuchea, arrives in Hanoi.25 Aug. 12, 1965
Aug. 16,
1965 James C.
Thomson, Jr., National Security Council Staff, sends memo to Bundy, the
President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs concerning the
uncovering of Son Ngoc Thanh in Saigon, “…has accidentally
uncovered anti-Sihanouk Khmer Serei leader Son Ngoc Thanh somewhere in
Saigon, now wants to establish a dialogue. State is properly skittish as
this guy has the political future of Harold Stassen but drives Sihanouk
crazy. We are permitting one or two more "contacts" with him--but we may
be risking a further Cambodia blow-up (our relations with Sihanouk are
currently euphoric relative to the recent past).” [21] Aug. 31,
1965
Cambodia deposited with UN her accession relating to
(1) Optional Protocol Concerning Acquisition of Nationality [7311] and (2) Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory
Settlement of Disputes [7312]. Sept. 23,
1965 Bundy sends
memo to President Johnson, “The departure of
Sihanouk from Cambodia for three months will likely mean a lull in
Cambodian diplomatic initiatives. However, he will probably continue his
soundings in various capitals, notably Moscow and Peiking, regarding
international guarantees of Cambodia's territory. He is currently
undergoing medical treatment in France. The French report some Cambodian
annoyance with the Chinese for frequently ignoring their position and
making them feel their small power status. Paris warns, however, that this
doesn't imply any willingness on the part of the Cambodians to move closer
to the West. They still see in the Chinese their only friend in a hostile
regional sea.” [21] Oct. 1, 1965
Chinese PM Zhou and Pham Van Dong meet in Beijing to
discuss
the war in Vietnam and possible expansion to Cambodia and
Laos. Joint Chiefs of Staff sends memo to
Secretary of Defense McNamara regarding the studies that conclude the
Vietcong use Cambodia for a source of supply, sanctuary and temporary
military facilities. Nov. 20, 1965 US Pres.
Johnson talks
by phone with Secretary McNamara concerning the North VN and Vietcong’s
use of Cambodian territory. On the same day, State Dept. telegram
to its Embassy in Vietnam concerning the authorization for operations in
Laos and Cambodia. Nov. 21,
1965 Assistant Secretary Bundy sends note to US Permanent Rep. to the UN Goldberg concerning the approaching of US and South VN military operations to Cambodian border. Dec. 1, 1965 The US Office of Current Intelligence issues a memo concerning Cambodia’s foreign policy. Dec. 3, 1965 Bundy informs Secretary of State Rusk about the US/South VN action against VC/PAVN forces in Cambodia. Dec. 9, 1965 US Commander in Vietnam, Westmoreland, telegram the Commander-in-Chief - Pacific, Sharp, regarding the cross border military operations. Dec. 11, 1965 US State Dept. telegram to the Embassy in Vietnam regarding the authorization for operations involving Cambodia. Dec. 14, 1965 US State Dept. telegram to inform Secretary Rush at Paris about possible ICC role in Cambodia. Dec. 18, 1965 US Sen. Mike Mansfield sends memo to
Pres. Johnson concerning his 16 countries and territories visit including
Cambodian. Dec. 23,
1965 Memo of
conversation between USSR Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin and US Dept. of
State Ambassador-at-Large Llewellyn E. Thompson on Hot Pursuit, “I gave the Ambassador
a copy of our press release on the question of actions our troops were
authorized to take in self-defense along the Cambodian border. I said that
I thought the American press had great exaggerated and distorted the
significance of this development. Dobrynin said, from the statement in the
press release, what did this really mean, that our troops would be making
deep incursions into Cambodia or bombing Cambodian targets? I replied in
the negative and said that this was actually confined to situations in
which there was a real need to shoot back in self-defense in order to
preserve the lives of our troops involved. Dobrynin asked how he should
report this. Was this an official statement? I replied that it was purely
an informal explanation of our policy but that I could tell him, for his
own information that it was done at the suggestion of the Secretary. He
expressed his appreciation and said that he had been confused, and he
thought that the diplomats in Washington with whom he had discussed the
matter, had also misunderstood what was involved.” [21] Dec. 27,
1965 Washington
informs Bangkok and Saigon of US concern about both countries support of
the Khmer Serei. [21] Dec. 28,
1965 US issue an
intelligence memo concerning Cambodia’s relationship with the Vietcong,
“The problem of
Cambodia's relationship with the Viet Cong centers on two broad but
related aspects. One is Sihanouk's foreign policy and how it has been
influenced by the growth of the Communist movement in South Vietnam. The
other is the use by the Viet Cong of Cambodian territory as a source of
supply, sanctuary, and political comfort. A thorough review of
intelligence from all sources confirms that the Viet Cong have procured
supplies in and through Cambodia but shows that the volume of such
supplies has been small in comparison with Viet Cong requirements and in
comparison with what they have received through Laos, by direct sea
infiltration, and from within South Vietnam. It is clear that with the
complicity of local Cambodian officials the Viet Cong have found safe
haven in many areas along the Cambodian border. The Communists have also
established small but useful clandestine facilities on Cambodian
territory. From all indications these facilities have played only a small
part in the over-all Communist effort in South Vietnam. A substantial body
of evidence indicates, however, that the Cambodian Government is not a
witting or willing accomplice in Viet Cong operations in Cambodia.
Intelligence reports confirm that Sihanouk is increasingly concerned over
charges that Cambodia is being used by the Viet Cong. These reports reveal
that although Phnom Penh has tried to take measures to curb such use, its
ability to police the 600-mile border with South Vietnam is extremely
limited.” [21] Dec. 29,
1965 McNamara sends letter to Rusk regarding the problem of Vietcong's supplies through Cambodia. Dec. 30,
1965 US President
Johnson talks by phone with Under Secretary of State Ball about Cambodian
situation; memo of the conversation, “Pres said he had been
worried about the Cambodian situation for some time--our harassing their
border. Pres said Ball in talking to Mansfield should ask him to tell
Sihanouk that he had reported to the President and the President
reciprocated Sihanouk's good wishes. He is to tell Sihanouk that we are
very anxious to have no border disturbances and we wish he would make a
study of these raids that are being initiated within his borders so that
our people would not pursue them. Ball said he would see what we could get
back to Sihanouk. Pres said we should put it on Sihanouk that he should
stop these raids from being initiated and that we don't want to go across
his borders. Pres said Mansfield is Sihanouk's biggest sponsor and he is a
hero to Mansfield. Pres [said] Mansfield should tell Sihanouk that he gave
a full three-hour report to the President and told him how great Sihanouk
is. We should try in this way to get a little closer to Sihanouk.”
[21]
Abbreviations
on this page
US and Australian officials
meet to discuss
situation in Cambodia. Jan. 5,
1966 James C. Thomson sends memo to Bundy concerning Cambodia Conference, “Although I understand that State as a whole remains very leery of resurrecting any Cambodia conference proposal, Allen Whiting suggests that we over here might want to consider such a move. The circumstances have altered considerably since Sihanouk's turn down of the previous conference proposal. Cambodia is more gravely threatened than ever before--by a pincer movement with MACV on Cambodia's eastern frontier and the Thai/GVN-supported Khmer Serei on the western frontier. Sihanouk is properly scared. It would be far less likely for him to shoot down the proposal under the present circumstances. Our interests here are two-fold and clear: first and more narrowly, to get the Thai and GVN to call off their dogs--an effort in which we have been so far markedly unsuccessful; but second and more important, to get the right people to a conference where the long-sought corridor conversations can finally take place. In short, there is more reason than ever for a Cambodia conference, both in terms of the heightened threat to Cambodia's security and in terms of our intensified quest for negotiations. So why not add this item to our current push? (Get the British and Soviets to take the initiative summoning such a conference.)” [21] Jan. 17, 1966 George Ball, Acting Secretary of State, sends letter
to McNamara concerning the Vietcong use of Cambodian to support its force
in South VN. Jan. 20, 1966 Cambodia places
with UN her ratification concerning Amendments to Articles 23, 27 and 61
of the Charter of the United Nations. Jan. 30,
1966 Sihanouk, in a
speech, charges that the Thai statements of widespread Khmer Serei
popularity in Cambodia was a view held by the US and asks the US Congress
to send some of its members to conduct an on-the-spot investigation. On the same day, Senator Hayden
receives an invitation from the Cambodian National Assembly to send a
delegation to investigate Khmer Serei versus Sihanouk popularity and
charges of Cambodian sanctuary for the Vietcong. [21] March 3,
1966 US Joint
Chiefs of Staff sends memo to
McNamara regarding measures to decrease infiltration into South VN from
Cambodian via waterways. March 11,
1966 R.W. Komer, President's Deputy Special Assistant for
National Security Affairs, sends memo to President Johnson, “…On delving further
into this, I have discovered a royal snafu. First, Hayden, Fulbright and
Aiken all referred this matter to the Vice President, as the titular
presiding officer of the Senate. The Vice President was about to sign
letters to Fulbright, Aiken and Mansfield pointing out that the Cambodians
had withdrawn the invite. We have held this up. Second, while Washington,
Bangkok, Saigon, and even Peiking all interpreted the Cambodian radio
broadcast of 24 February (an attack on Symington's criticism of VC use of
Cambodia) as stating that the Cambodian government withdrew the invitation
addressed by its Parliament to three U.S. Senators, a red-faced State
Department, checking the French text yesterday, found out that the French
word used also means "reminds." They then went back this morning to the
Cambodian original and found that the verb is in fact "reminds." Thus the
invite still stands. Third, FE in State still feels strongly that we
should not pick up the invitation because (a) the Thais and GVN would be
sore as hops; (b) it would give Sihanouk another propaganda victory; (c)
Fulbright says his committee is too busy to travel; and (d) the Mansfield
expedition to Cambodia demonstrates how little can be accomplished through
such contacts. Others, including Harriman (I am told), believe that it
might be better simply to defer this matter and play for time, perhaps
returning an interim answer that the Congress is too busy at this moment.
They see merit in keeping open at least a tenuous channel to the Prince.
Queries: Should we leave this to the Vice President, or do a letter on
your behalf? On the merits, would you prefer a soft deferral or a polite
turndown?” [21] March 12,
1966 R.W. Komer sends memo to President Johnson concerning
the congressmen to Cambodia, “I won't bother you any
further on this; it can be easily handled in the following way if you
approve. 1. I've called Senator Aiken. He was most understanding when I
explained how State and I had misinformed you. In fact, he was so pleasant
that I told him how I was recommending we handle the matter. He completely
agreed, and feels it makes great good sense not to slam the door on
Sihanouk. 2. I've cleared with State a soft reply which neither rejects
the Cambodian invite of three Congressmen nor accepts it--but simply
pleads the press of Hill business at this time. This leaves us maximum
flexibility and offends nobody. 3. It seems to me better if the Vice
President formally answers the Hill inquiries and, as President of the
Senate, signs the letter to his Cambodian counterpart. This leaves you
above the play. If you agree, I will so recommend to the Vice President.”
[21] April 2, 1966 Bundy sends memo to
Rostow regarding presidential inquiry about emissary to
Cambodia. April 18, 1966 Director Trueheart informs
Bundy of some possible effects of Cambodian recognition of North VN
political representation. May 16, 1966
Cambodian representative to the UN, Huot Sambath,
files a complaint with the UN Security Council, charging that Thai forces
had shelled and attacked Cambodian positions around Preah Vihear from Apr.
14 to 22. The most serious attack was on Apr. 19 when Cambodian defenders
repulsed more than 1000 attackers, inflicting more than 300 casualties.
May 28,
1966 R.W. Komer sends memo to President Johnson concerning
Cambodia, “Your
comment to the NSC staff that you were not entirely satisfied with our
current "hard line" toward Cambodia crystallized some of my thinking too.
Requests from our embattled field commanders that we bomb Cambodia or at
least drop leaflets leave me cold--they would have far too little effect
to outweigh the political uproar they would cause. Hence State is quite
right in turning off these "gung ho" suggestions. On the other hand, there
ought to be imaginative ways of putting a quiet squeeze on Sihanouk via
economic means and psywar. Intelligence reports suggest economic distress
in Cambodia, growing disaffection with Sihanouk's policies--including his
diversion of rice from Cambodian mouths to those of the VC and Hanoi.
Meanwhile much Delta rice from the supposedly best-pacified area of
Vietnam is rumored to be flowing to Cambodia. I am working on a rice
strategy to cut back this flow, as well as eventually reduce the amount of
rice we have to ship in. We are also taking a look at preclusive buying of
Cambodian rice through third parties, so as to reduce the flow to our
enemies. Surely we can out-buy Hanoi and Peking. I'm also pressing for
quick study of other means of quiet economic warfare against Cambodia, as
probably more effective and less politically risky than the warlike
gestures proposed from Saigon. The above will take time but we'll keep the
needle in.” [21] May 28,
1966 Special Assistant Komer
sends memo to
Pres. Johnson regarding Cambodia. June 12, 1966 Vietcong representatives in Phnom Penh is reportedly
told Cambodian Government that its support is required to fight and win
decisively the war in 1966.
Prince Sihanouk agrees to sell needed rice to the Vietcong. [21] June 13, 1966 Pentagon approve the recommendation by Joint Chief to organize, train, and equip an indigenous force of intelligence agents, reconnaissance teams, and reaction teams for possible future employment in cross-border operation into Cambodia. [21] June 21,
1966 Assistant Rostow sends memo to
Rusk concerning possible approaches to the Cambodia
problem. June 25,
1966 Rostow sends note to
Pres. Johnson about the visit of Italian Abm. To
Cambodia. June 29,
1966 Acting Secretary Ball sends
memo
to Pres. Johnson regarding action being taken on
Cambodia. July 1,
1966 Acting Secretary Ball sends
memo
to Pres. Johnson regarding possible visit by Eugene Black to
Cambodia. July 8,
1966 Rostow sends memo to
President Johnson concerning US next moves on and Eugene Black Mission to
Cambodia Aug. 4,
1966 US Embassy in India telegram
to the State Dept concerning US-Cambodian relations. PRC PM Zhou Enlai advises
Pham Van Dong, in their meeting in Beijing, to make full use of the road
via Cambodia as well as the sea route. The Chinese also agree to
Vietnamese request for reinforcement of forces for air defense, defense of
railways, land roads, and aid to build roads. [25] Sept.
1966 Sept. 12, 1966 Harriman and French Amb. Charles Lucet meets to discuss Cambodia. Sept. 20, 1966 William Jorden, National Security Council Staff, sends memo to Rostow, Pres.’s Johnson Special Assistant, concerning Cambodia. Sept. 24, 1966 US Joint Chiefs of Staff sends memo to
McNamara concerning Cross-Border Operation. Sept. 30,
1966
Cambodia joins
the Asia Development Bank. John Roche, US President's Special Assistant, sends
memo to President Johnson, “The Baguio Conference
might offer a fresh opportunity for reconciliation with Prince Sihanouk.
--Sihanouk, caught between Thai and Vietnamese ambitions, thought that he
could get guarantees from the Chicoms. --It now appears that he feels he
took out insurance with a bankrupt firm, and might be willing to shift his
account. --Sihanouk is more reliable than a canary in a coal-mine when it
comes to indicating changes in the power atmosphere in Southeast Asia. He
is in motion away from the Chicoms. But, he has to have guarantees. And
the State Department does not want to create ripples in Bangkok by raising
the question. Might it not be possible at Baguio to formulate a
multilateral statement that the powers there convened will respect the
sovereignty of their neighbors, whether present or not, whether Communist,
neutralist, or free world in alignment? This would do much to establish
the broad, principled goals of the "pacific powers." --It would provide a
formula fully in accord with your Vietnamese policy, namely, a
stabilization of frontiers in Asia with no "wars of liberation" launched
from either side. --It would undermine the inevitable attack on the Baguio
Conference as a "council of war." --It would supply a basis for reopening
our direct contacts with Sihanouk from which might come a strengthening of
the I.C.C. and a Cambodia neutral against the VC and PAVN.” [21] US Commander in VN, Westmoreland, send telegram to Commander in Chief - Pacific, Sharp, concerning the increase use of Cambodia by North VN and Vietcong. Oct. 6, 1966 US intelligence services issues a report of estimation of the internal political prospects and the international orientation of Cambodia over the next year or so. Oct. 22, 1966
Philippine
and US officials meet to discuss
US relations with Cambodia. Oct. 31,
1966 US Embassy in the Philippines sends telegram to the
Department of State, “…1. I spoke to
President Marcos today about his aide-memoire on Cambodia addressed to
President Johnson and he confirmed that he had received a verbal message
from Prince Sihanouk through Phil Ambassador in Phnom Penh stating
Sihanouk's desire to normalize relations with U.S. message asked Marcos to
discuss matter with President Johnson but said that if anything leaked out
he, Sihanouk, would deny making any overtures. 2. Marcos says he believes that
U.S. should convey to Sihanouk through Marcos its regret over alleged
mistake bombings and offer to send them team to investigate. Repeat this
is Marcos's idea and not Sihanouk's. Marcos further suggested that
investigating team once in Cambodia would be able to check on North
Vietnamese and Viet Cong hostile establishments for actions inside
Cambodian territory. 3. All this seems rather far fetched to us and I
conveyed to Marcos Secretary's comments on Sihanouk. However, Marcos told
me he hopes to serve as intermediary between U.S. and Cambodia just as he
claims he did between Malaysia and Indonesia. Once Marcos receives message
from us to Sihanouk that we regret the bombings he will transmit it
through his Ambassador in Phnom Penh and will then await Sihanouk's
reaction to our further expression of willingness to send investigating
team. If Sihanouk agrees, Marcos would then announce here our regrets and
Sihanouk's willingness to accept investigating team. 4. I understand
Cambodian Charge to Manila was called back suddenly to Phnom Penh on
October 27th, the day of President Johnson's departure. 5. Will respond to
your query on Johnson-Marcos communiqué U.S. state visit in
septel.” [21] Joint Chiefs of Staff sends memo to McNamara concerning actions to deal with Vietcong and North VN use of Cambodian territory. Dec. 21,
1966
Abbreviations
on this page
US intelligence services release a special national intelligence estimate “Significance of Cambodia to the Vietnamese Communist War Effort”. March 24, 1967 US State Dept. sends telegram to its embassy in Australia concerning the forthcoming visit by Australian PM Holt to Phnom Penh. April
1967 April 4,
1967 National
Assembly holds an urgent session and after heated debates passes a
resolution giving Sihanouk special powers. 25 April 10,
1967 Chinese PM
Zhou Enlai and Pham Van Dong meet in Beijing to discuss issues related to
the war in Vietnam. [Conversation relate to Cambodia] April 11,
1967 Chinese and
Vietnamese communist meet again; Samlaut uprising is discussed. [Conversation] April 14, 1967 Bundy sends a briefing memo to Secretary Rusk regarding his discussion of Cambodia with Australian FM Hasluck. April 21, 1967 US, New Zealnd, and Australia official meet to discuss
Cambodia. April 30, 1967 Lon Nol resigns his premiership, citing injuries from
a car accident. May 1, 1967 Chairman of the Cambodian Study Group, Unger, sends an action memo to Under-Secretary of State, Katzenbach, regarding to initial report by the joint State-Defense-CIA Study Group for Cambodia. May 3, 1967 Penn Nouth is appointed Prime Minister to head an
emergency government. May 22, 1967 Pentagon
authorizes limited cross-border operations into the northeast corner of
Cambodia, using US-South VN Special Forces, code-named “Daniel
Boone”. June 6,
1967
Nguyen Huu Tho, NLF president, respond favorably by
letter to Prince Sihanouk’s appeal for the recognition and respect of
Cambodia’s territorial integrity. June 8,
1967
North VN PM Pham Van Dong makes a declaration of
recognizing Cambodian independence, neutrality, sovereignty and
territorial integrity. The
declaration makes in response to Prince Sihanouk’s appeal for the
recognition and respect of Cambodia’s territorial
integrity. June 15, 1967 Country
Director for Burma and Cambodia, Ewing, sends memo to
Bundy concerning statement of respect for Cambodia’s present
frontiers. June 19, 1967 William Jorden sends memo to
Read, Executive Secretary of the State Dept., regarding Cambodia’s
territorial integrity. Aug. 11,
1967
Cambodia accepts
the Protocol for the Further extension of the Period of Validity of the
Convention on the Declaration of Death of Missing Persons. Sept. 11, 1967 Aldrich, Assistant Legal Adviser, sends memo to Bundy concerning proposals to inhibit NVA/VC exploitation of Cambodian territory. Sept. 14, 1967 Habib, Dep. Assistant Sec. of State for East Asian Affair, sends an action memo to Katzenbach regarding Cambodian policy and JCS proposal to extend Daniel Boone Operations. Oct. 5, 1967 Warnke,
Assistant Sec. of Defense for international Security Affairs, sends memo to
McNamara regarding Daniel Boone Operation. Nov. 29, 1967 US State Dept. telegram to its embassy in Australia regarding transmission to Cambodian Government note and evidence concerning VC/NVA use of Cambodian territory. Dec. 4, 1967 US deliver
note to the Cambodian Foreign Ministry expressing its deep concern over
VC/NVA use of Cambodian territory and offer US support for a more
effective ICC monitoring of border activity. [21] Dec. 5, 1967 US Commander in Vietnam, Westmoreland, telegram to JCS regarding his discussion with Admiral Sharp about enemy situation and recommendation for actions to be taken. On the same day, at a cabinet meeting, Cambodia issue is discussed. Dec. 6, 1967 US Chairman of JCS, Wheeler, telegram to Westmoreland regarding decision of the cabinet meeting. Dec. 8, 1967 US State Dept. telegram to its embassy in Australia regarding military operation into northeast tip of Cambodia. Dec. 12, 1967 Marshall Wright, National Security Council Staff, sends memo to Rostow asking “What to do about Cambodia”. Dec. 14, 1967 US intelligence services issue a special national intelligence estimate “Significance of Cambodia to the Vietnamese Communist War Effort”. Dec. 15, 1967 US Amb. at Large Harriman sends memo to Pres. Johnson concerning that violation of Cambodian borders. Dec. 20, 1967 Cambodian
Gove. flatly reject US contention that VC and NVA make extensive use of
Cambodian territory. The rejection is in response to US Dec. 4 note. [21] Dec. 26, 1967 Gen. Westmoreland telegram to Chairman of JCS, Wheeler, regarding military operations in the Tri-border area of Cambodia. Dec. 27, 1967 Rostow informs Pres. Johnson, who is in Texas, about situation in Cambodia. [Telegram] Dec. 29, 1967 Pres.
Johnson is informed
by Rostow of his message dispatched to Amb. Bowles to ask Indian Gove. to
make a maximum effort through the ICC to end Communist use of Cambodian
territory and Secretary Rusk’s recommendations on follow-up actions to the
Sihanouk interview with Washington Post.
Abbreviations
on this page
US Pres. Johnson is informed of Amb. Bowles' mission to Cambodia. [Telegram] Jan. 4, 1968
Jan. 7, 1968 Bowles telegram
to the State Dept. regarding a course of action to be taken on
Cambodia. US Embassy
in India inform
State Dept. concerning Amb. Bowles’s mission to Cambodia. Jan. 10, 1968 Legal
Adviser Meeker sends a memo to
Secretary Rusk regarding possible US statement on territorial integrity of
Cambodia. Jan. 31, 1968 Penn Nouth becomes Prime Minister
(01/31/68-08/14/69). Feb. 27, 1968 Executive
Secretary of the State Dept., Read, sends memo to
Rostow concerning Australian declaration on Cambodia’s border and its
implication for the US. March 7, 1968 CIA issues an intelligence report indicating the Vietnamese Communists continue to use Cambodian territory for tactical sanctuary, for base areas, for the infiltration of personnel, and as a source of rice, medicines, and sundry supplies. [21] March 19, 1968 US Embassy in Vietnam telegram to the State Dept. concerning SEA Coordinating Committee recommendations. April 1, 1968 A US Navy P-3 Orion patrol aircraft is shot down by two Cambodian patrol boats in the Gulf of Siam, killing all crew members. [21] May 25, 1968 Cambodian Navy captures a Philippine tugboat 1 mile inside Cambodian territory on the Mekong River and detains 8 Filipino and 2 US Army crewmembers. [21] May 27, 1968 Assistant Secretary Bundy sends an action memo to Secretary Rusk regarding special fire authority against VC/NVA in Cambodia. May 28, 1968 US Pres. Johnson and Australian PM meet to discuss situation with respect to NVA in Cambodia and the problem that the two countries face. [21] June 8, 1968 The eight Filipinos, tugboat crew detained by Cambodian Navy on May 25, are released. [21] June 10, 1968 The two US Army tugboat crew, who were detained by Cambodian Navy on May 25, are released. [21] June 19,
1968 Chinese PM
Zhou Enlai and PLAF Dep. Commander Pham Hung meet in Beijing to discuss
varieties of issues including weapons to Khmer communist. [Memo of
conversation] July 8, 1968 State Dept. telegram to its Embassy in Vietnam regarding Cambodia. July 17, 1968 Cambodian Navy seizes a US Army utility landing craft, which strayed into Cambodian waters on Mekong River, and detains 11 Americans and one RVN policeman. US express regrets and ask for return of vessel and personnel on board. Prince Sihanouk threatens to try the men under Cambodian law. [21] July 22,
1968 Cambodia
rejects US explanation of inadvertent intrusion and characterizes the
penetration as deliberate act of provocation. Cambodia also indicates an
intention to try the detained crew and confiscate the vessel. [21] July 25, 1968 Prince Sihanouk, in a speech to National Congress, says the men detained on July 17 would be interned till end of hostilities and their craft confiscated. [21] July 26, 1968 The State Dept. telegram to its Embassy in India regarding Cambodian detention of US soldiers. On the same day, Cambodia grants access by the Australians to visit the detained. July 29, 1968 Dep. Assis. Secretary Brown sends an action memo to Secretary Rusk regarding problem of release seized craft and crew in Cambodia. July 30,
1968 At a regular Pres. Johnson's cabinet meeting, course of actions are considered against Cambodia. [Memo of meeting] Aug. 1,
1968 US Senator Mike Mansfield write letter to Secretary of State Rusk regarding his view on Cambodia. Sept. 4,
1968 US Pres. Johnson is informed about Eugene Black's visit to Cambodia from Sept.11-13. Sept. 5,
1968 Secretary Rusk sends Pres. Johnson his instructions to Eugene Black. Sept. 6,
1968 US Joint Chief of Staff, in an attempt to pressure Cambodia to release US soldiers, propose plans for harassment of commercial traffic to and from Cambodian on the Mekong and Bassc Rivers. The JCS also suggest using Market Time ships to capture Cambodian naval craft that are violating South VN territorial waters in the Gulf of Siam. [21] Sept. 16,
1968 Rostow sends memo to Pres. Johnson regarding result of Eugene Black visit to Cambodia. Sept. 24,
1968 CIA prepares
a memo on
the subject of Cambodian border problem. Sept. 23,
1968
Agreement
on administrative arrangements for the PREK THNOT power and irrigation
development project is opened for signature at UN headquarters in New
York. Cambodia signs on
Nov.13, 1968. Sept. 30, 1968 Assistant Secretary of Defense Warnke sends memo to
Dep. Sec. Of Defense Nitze concerning the treat pose ny VC/VNA use of
Cambodian territory as a sanctuary and source of
supply. Oct. 10, 1968 Rusk sends letter to Secretary of Defense Clifford
sharing his view that it would premature to resort now to military or
other direct pressures on Cambodia for the release of 11 US soldiers.
[21] Marshall Wright sends memo to
Rostow pertaining to Cambodia. Oct. 28, 1968 Rostow informs
Pres. Johnson with regard to Prince Sihanouk's appointment of Thay Sok as
custodian of the Cambodian Embassy building in
Washington. Nov. 5, 1968
Nov. 7, 1968 Chairman of the JCS telegram
to Commander in Chief - Pacific, McCain, regarding actions against
Cambodian. Nov. 17, 1968 Mao Zedong and Pham Van Dong meet in Beijing to
discuss war and Chinese aid to the war effort in Vietnam. [Conversation
related to Cambodia] Nov. 19, 1968 Cambodian FM Norodom Phurissia, in a conversation
with French Amb. Dauge, indicates that Cambodians would release US
detainees if Sihanouk received personal message addressed to him from
Pres. Johnson and that Sihanouk sincerely desire to improve relations with
US. [21] Nov. 26, 1968 US Embassy in France telegram
to the State Dept. informing it of French Amb.'s conversation with Prince
Sihanouk in regard to US-Cambodia relations. Dec. 3, 1968 US Chairman of JCS sends memo to Dep. Under Sect. Of
Defense Nitze concerning Daniel Boone Operations. Dec. 5, 1968 US Embassy in Moscow telegram
to the State Dept. in regard to possible reestablishment of US-Cambodian
relations. Dec. 12, 1968 Bundy, Assistant Sec. Of State, sends action memo to
Katzenback, Under Sec. Of State, concerning Defense Department request for
new Daniel Boone Operational authority. Dec. 17, 1968 Secretary Rusk instructs Amb. Bowles not to take
further actions in regard to US-Cambodian differences. On the same day,
Rusk also telegrams
to US Embassy in France with Pres. Johnson's message to Prince
Sihanouk. Dec. 18, 1968 C-in-C Pacific McCain telegram
to the Chairman of JCS in regarding to co-relation among South VN,
Cambodia and Laos. Dec. 21, 1968 State Dept. telegram
to its Embassy in Vietnam concerning military operations in South VN near
Cambodian border. Dec. 23, 1968 Prince Sihanouk announces the release of 11 US
soldiers and 1 South VN detained since July 17 when their landing craft
entered Cambodian waters and was captured by the Cambodian Navy.
[21] Dec. 29, 1968 McCain telegram
to Wheeler concerning the effects of neutralization of
Cambodia.
Abbreviations
on this page
Cambodia accepts
the Plant Protection Agreement for the Southeast Asia and Pacific Region.
Feb. 9, 1969
Feb. 24,
1969
Cambodia deposits with UN her instruments of
ratification relating to (1) Convention concerning the employment of woman
during the night [587], Convention concerning the night work of young
persons employed in industry [589], Convention concerning the use of white lead in
painting [596], and Convention concerning forced or compulsory
labor [612]. March 21,
1969
Cambodia and Japan signs an agreement
concerning a donation towards the execution of the Prek Thnot power and
irrigation development project. April 15,
1969
US recognize the sovereignty, independence,
neutrality, and territorial integrity of Cambodia, two years after Prince
Sihanouk made an appeal. Zhou Enlai and Pham Van Dong meet in Beijing to
discuss various issues; regarding to Cambodia, Zhou Enlai says:
"New developments have been seen in Indochina. We have to
acknowledge that Nixon is more intelligent than Johnson. He established
diplomatic relations with Cambodia and recognized Cambodia's borders with the
neighboring countries. As far as the situation in Cambodia is concerned, we are
not as optimistic as you are. Even though [Sihanouk] carries out a policy
of double-dealing, he is tilting to the right. The US also knows that
China is supplying materiel to forces in South Vietnam via Cambodia and that the NLF armed
forces are using part of Cambodian territory for their operations."25 May 8, 1969
May 24,
1969
PM Lon Nol meet officially with North VN’s
representative, Nguyen Thuong, and the NLF delegate, Nguyen Van Hieu in an
unsuccessful attempt to deal with the NVA/VC problem. July 24,
1969
International Health Regulations is adopted by the
22nd World Health Assembly at Boston, USA; it come into force
for Cambodia on Jan. 1, 1971. [10921] June 29,
1969
Nguyen Tan Phat, prime minister of the Provisional
Revolutionary Government (PRG) of South Vietnam, pays a 6-days official
visit to Phnom Penh. June 30,
1969
Cambodia and
Netherlands exchanges letters
constituting an agreement concerning the Netherlands contribution to the
Prek Thnot Power and Irrigation Development Project. July 31, 1969
Aug. 1, 1969 Penn Nouth resigns his premiership for health
reason. Aug. 11,
1969
Cambodia deposits with UN her instruments of
ratification relating to agreement concerning subscriptions to newspapers
and periodicals [8853]; postal money orders and postal travelers’ cheques
[8848]; cash-on-delivery items [8850]; and collection of bills, drafts, etc. [8851]. Sept. 1969 Deputy PM Sirik Matak takes over as acting Prime
Minister. Sept. 3, 1969 Ho Chi Minh died; Prince Sihanouk departs for Hanoi
to attend his funeral. Oct. 2,
1969
Prince Sihanouk, citing financial difficulties and
inactivity, terminates the mandate of the International Control Commission
(ICC); its members are asked to depart Cambodia by the end of the
year. Nov. 20,
1969
Cambodia and Denmark sign an agreement
concerning a loan for the economic development of Cambodia. Nov. 25,
1969
Cambodia and Singapore sign an agreement
concerning Trade and Economic Co-operation. Dec. 27, 1969 Sangkum Reash Niyum hold its National Congress, which
supports Prince Sihanouk's rejection of government measures to
de-nationalize the bank and the import and export sector. Dec. 31,
1969
Cambodia joins
the International Monetary Fund. |
All Rights Reversed
| GO TO HOMEPAGE | PREVIOUS PAGE | NEXT PAGE | Sign Quest-book |